Feynman on Curiosity

This video is one of the effective advertisements I've seen for the value of gathering and systematizing empirical knowledge, by none other than the late Richard Feynman:

Also, since you are probably wondering: the music is Primavera by Ludovico Einaudi.

The Limits of Formal Theory in Sociology

Sociologists and economists often disagree about the role of so-called "formal" theory in understanding social behavior. For the most part, sociologists are much more skeptical that mathematical models (with little reference to data) can clearly and accurately describe, explain, and predict how humans act, think, and feel. I take a middle-of-the-road position: such models of human behavior can be helpful for illuminating arguments, but often they are such crude approximations of reality that they can obscure what is actually going on. I'm reminded of Max Tegmark's brilliant article on the mathematical universe hypothesis, in which he claims that the universe is a giant mathematical structure. In fact, the disciplines can be understood in reference to derivations from known mathematical laws, as shown in this diagram:

The problem, as Tegmark suggests in this diagram, is that until we understand how to reconcile mathematically general relativity and quantum field theory, as well as how this reconciled theory is related to other fields in physics and related fields, mathematizing sociology will at best be a set of (possibly crude) approximations of reality.

Physics Envy

The NYT published an op-ed today by a pair of political scientists on "physics envy" by sociologists, economists, and political scientists. The authors mainly argue that theory can be useful even when it is wrong or unsupported by data, and briefly mention that data analysis is useful even if theoretical contributions are not obvious. I disagree with the former, but not the latter. For a similar view, see this post by the theoretical physicist Sean Carroll.

Big Science and Sociology

I highly recommend this video featuring Dirk Helbing, a sociologist and erstwhile physicist who is (along with others) attempting to create a CERN-like society-simulating project for the social sciences by combining information from large data sets with simulated models of complex social systems:

Universal Limits in High-Dimensional Statistics

The MIT Center on Operations Research is hosting a talk tomorrow on universal limits in high-dimensional statistics. The basic idea is that, for all fields of empirical study from sociology to high-energy physics, some criterion for "statistical significance" is crucial for making decisions based on the data. (The current hunt for the Higgs Boson particle is in fact based on a modified criterion for statistical significance.) The problem, however, is that we are entering a world of big data, in which data structures have many dimensions, thus altering the potential usefulness of such criterion for statistical significance.

Is Everything Culture?

In my readings on culture, I've found a fascinating set of theories called digital physics. These theories posit that the universe fundamentally consists of information (i.e., the "it for bit" doctrine that every particle, atom, quark, and so on is describable as a dichotomous "yes or no" categorization), and thus that the universe is in principle computable. Opponents to digital physics claim that reality is continuous, but the rejoinder is that reality only appears continuous, and is fundamentally categorical (for example, the Planck length suggests that reality is quantized). More relevant to sociology, these perspectives suggest that everything is culture -- i.e., information -- and thus that societies can be usefully modeled as information systems.

Big Science in Sociology

The search for the Higgs Boson particle has captivated a wide range of people all over the world, and the construction of the Large Hadron Collider is the reason for this widespread interest. Is such a "big science" approach possible in the social sciences, including sociology? Although the details to me seem obscure, researchers in Europe have developed a proposal for what they call the FuturICT, a "big science" project for the social sciences (ICT stands for "Information and Communication Technology") in the mode of the Manhattan Project, Apollo Project, and Large Hadron Collider. But what is it, exactly, that they are proposing? I get the sense it's a giant computer simulation, but it doesn't seem entirely clear.

Theory of Everything?

A new journal in biology called Life has published an unusual article in its inaugural edition: a paper by Erik Andrulis titled the "Theory of the Origin, Evolution, and Nature of Life." You can find the paper here. At 105 pages and 800 references, his paper seems Sokal-like, except it apparently is not a hoax at all. As a result this paper is unusual, but especially so for two reasons: first, Andrulis is apparently a well-respected biological scientist who has done important work on RNA, and second, Life appears to have all the trappings of a well-respected, peer-reviewed scientific journal, including a well-respected editorial board.

In essence, Andrulis outlines a theoretical framework  that (supposedly) unifies the microcosmic and macrocosmic realms, validates predicted laws of nature, and explains the origin and evolution of cellular life. Like most non-biologists encountering this paper, I've only skimmed it, but apparently reality consists of geometric entities "gyres." Sounds good, except Andrulis provides no evidence (as far as I can tell) that these gyres exist.

It's easy to criticize this paper, if only for ambition of his theory. In one section he purports to unify all laws of nature, while in another he addresses the meaning of life. Even more astounding is the offhand way he presents his theory. For example, on page 55, Andrulis briefly remarks: "Please note the unity of reality and life as revealed by this theory." Can the unity of reality even be "noted"? However, my favorite part of the paper is on page 61, simply because of the sheer grandiosity of his assertion: "I refer the reader to the Theory section for a complete presentation of theoretical answers to many of science’s most challenging questions."

Questions abound how this paper was published despite peer review (perhaps it was a publicity stunt for the journal), and about the sanity of Erik Andrulis. From the position of a sociologist of culture, however, the more interesting question concerns why this paper was so heavily criticized, and whether or not papers such as these have a place in scientific journals. Andrulis' paper, I suspect, is filled with flaws and inconsistencies, but I contend there is often insight from theoretical frameworks that we "know" are generally wrong. Thus, the problem, from my perspective, is not that Andrulis wrote this paper, but rather that there is not a biological journal (to my knowledge) where scientists can publish speculative or half-formed theories that are probably "wrong" but nonetheless help us think about the world in a different way. (Sociology, in contrast, in part because of our methodological pluralism and historical connections with philosophy, has a number of journals in which theories, even those that are highly speculative, can be developed and publicized.)